Cyberspace is experiencing a new Westphalian moment. Following the trials and tribulations of surveillance and “techno-feudalism,” the global IT storm that has been raging since June 20261 sets the stage for a new architecture of control centered on digital networks. The numerous breaches that have opened up here and there in banking and financial systems do not stem primarily from vulnerabilities inherent in the expansion of digital connectivity and hostilities on the strategic stage, even though these vulnerabilities certainly exist. The evidence shows that they result primarily from a planned destabilization agenda2 carried out by a small circle of powers and geopolitical actors.
As in previous phases—but this time in a much more overt and audacious manner—these actors are exploiting digital interdependencies to undermine the reliability of banking and financial services, as well as communications, energy, and logistics, and to force a series of changes in the digital realm as well as in other sectors.
A Masterstroke for Control
The goal of these changes is, in principle, twofold: to make access to the global network contingent on verification of users’ identities; and to accelerate the adoption of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), thereby enabling the widespread mediation of transactions by a centralized authority. These two aspects point to the same control strategy, justified in advance by the response to what is officially described as an information security crisis.
Just as the COVID-19 digital certificate3 conditioned access to urban spaces based on individuals’ vaccination status during the pandemic, online transactions are likely to be subject to identity verification criteria. As for digital currencies (CBDCs), they alter the very nature of money by incorporating a conditionality function.4 In other words, money becomes programmable, with transactions subject to approval by a third party or a computerized process based on a compliance framework.
A Systems Approach
This development builds on earlier ideologies and institucional steps. Starting in 2022, the Rosalind project5 led by the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of England developed the software layer for retail digital currencies, integrating conditionality at the IT protocol level, while the Unified Ledger6 developed by the same Bank for International Settlements incorporated a three-party transaction model into monetary exchanges. Given the massive scale of the flows in question, the authorization function can only be delegated to the computational power of artificial intelligence.7 Similarly, access to social media platforms,8 much like banking apps or other digital services, has begun to require verification of identity and content compliance.
Intermediation is part of an integrated governance framework. Regulatory authorities identify the flows that must be subject to intermediation—in our case, digital services and financial transactions—by first defining a standardization framework, which is itself inspired by an ethical framework guiding the attitudes to be upheld within the societal context and in light of global risks.9 Upstream destabilization efforts, ethics, international standards, intermediation, and then regulation thus form a governance architecture that bypasses citizen deliberation and can be applied to cyberspace as well as to other areas of governance described as high-risk (climate, biodiversity, health, cybersecurity and AI safety, finance, peace and conflict, disinformation, etc.).
Beyond Surveillance and Mass Biometrics: Intermediation
Historically, the Internet and cyberspace have been shaped both by a “centrifugal” trend toward decentralization and by a “centripetal” movement toward monopoly and surveillance. The latter trend was pushed even further during the COVID-19 pandemic with the deployment of the first global biometric network of “connected bodies.”10 New concerns regarding the monitoring and transparency of cyberspace have emerged as a result. These echo concerns that were first expressed in initiatives such as the 1996 Declaration of Independence by John Perry Barlow and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, later at the 2014 NetMundial summit hosted by Brazil, and in Shoshana Zuboff’s (2018) scholarly work on “surveillance capitalism.”
Despite this corporate and monopolistic pressure, the Internet continues, as best it can, to serve as an “infrastructure of freedom” in the sense that it enables a system of exchange that bypasses intermediaries. In concrete terms, the global web offers the possibility of peer-to-peer information exchange—whether centralized or decentralized—without the intervention of a third party or any specific conditions, even though certain forms of exclusion do exist (national firewalls, government censorship, shadow banning, lack of net neutrality, tariff barriers, etc.). The intermediation taking root today will therefore have the effect of limiting this transactional space and reinforcing a complementary path toward centralization—one that was, in fact, theorized on a large scale as far back as the time of Marx, Engels, and Bogdanov, with the aim of extending monopolistic control within the socialist framework.
A blind spot returning at full speed
This form of monopoly—achieved not through the acquisition of resources and means of production but through interference in the very flow of transactions—has not been highlighted by observers of capitalism and cyberspace. The oversight of such a strategic feature has far-reaching consequences. In particular, it suggests that much of the civil resistance to Internet control has been shaped by the upper echelons of the geopolitical architecture with the aim of containing dissent. John Perry Barlow, as well as Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, Shoshana Zuboff, Thomas Piketty, and even the creators of certain decentralized technologies (blockchain, encryption), are part of these influential circles. All have unanimously emphasized the excesses of capital concentration and surveillance, while overlooking the strategic role that intermediation—which is currently being assembled—would come to play.
The cascade of orchestrated crises currently unfolding before our eyes is specifically intended to create a “global complex shock”11 and, in response, trigger the aforementioned reforms. Only a handful of entities with the capacity to coordinate on the global stage are capable of pursuing such an aggressive agenda and concealing their actions within the apparent fragmentation of the global chessboard. British intelligence agencies (MI612 and GCHQ13) possess this capability, notably the National Cyber Force14, which operates at a higher hierarchical level than the U.S. NSA, the “Five Eyes” alliance, and other national intelligence services. Possibly also the NSA and operators within the World Economic Forum, notably Bi.Zone and Sberbank15, which conducted Operation “Cyber Polygon”16 in July 2020 with the aim of anticipating a disruption to logistics and energy networks. Contrary to official statements, the attacks that have been ongoing since June 2026 cannot be attributed to China, Iran, or North Korea, since the governments of these countries are controlled by London17.
A Shift in Perspective
Such an agenda alters both the conception and the nature of efforts to ensure a secure and open Internet. The stakes go far beyond promoting the rule of law, transparency, and the decentralization of institutions and technologies in cyberspace, or seeking to temper corporate and governmental hostility even slightly.
The orchestrated nature of current maneuvers reflects a capacity for transnational coordination that was not visible until now, not even at the time of the NSA revelations in 2013. Cyberspace is viewed as a “connector” capable of enabling discretionary control over various human activities through information and intermediation functions. These functions align with previously observed monopolistic practices. The medium-term outlook is to shape societies based on authorization, in which every transaction, movement, or interaction will require the approval of a controlling authority beyond democratic control.
This project has a name: “infrastructural” fascism. Its new form of control is not based on overt coercion and enforced loyalty to the state, but rather on the expansion of social control and subversion through the new mechanisms of governance we have mentioned. Ethics and standardization whitewashes any malicious intent, while intermediation expands the scope of control.
- Soulard, F. (2026). IT and Banking Storm. Available at https://dunia.earth/tempete-bancaire-et-informatique/
- Ibid.
- EU digital COVID certificate https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-digital-covid-certificate/
- Soulard, F. (2026). Vers une nouvelle ère de surveillance financière. https://shs.cairn.info/revue-securite-globale-2026-2-page-99?lang=fr
- https://www.bis.org/project/rosalind
- https://www.bis.org/publications/aer-2023/blueprint-future-monetary-system-improving-old-enabling-new
- Soulard, F (2025). L’assaut technocratique de l’IA. Available at https://www.epge.fr/lassaut-technocratique-de-lia/
- In particular, Facebook requires authors of problematic content to submit facial scans.
- Escape key (2026). Philip Dru : administrator. Available at https://escapekey.substack.com/p/philip-dru-administrator
- Soulard, F. (2026). Global biosurveillance under scrutiny. Available at https://dunia.earth/en/global-biosurveillance-under-scrutiny/
- https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4005644?v=%5B%27pdf%27%5D
- National Cyber Force Transforms country’s cyber capabilities to protect UK. Available at https://archive.ph/nCw8a
- Burgess, M. (2020). The UK created a secretive, elite hacking force. Here’s what it does. Available at https://archive.ph/9ukiN
- https://powerbase.info/index.php/National_Cyber_Force
- Russian bank. https://powerbase.info/index.php/Sberbank
- https://2020.cyberpolygon.com/news/cyber-polygon-2020-international-online-exercise-ends-in-success/
- Soulard, F. (2026). False dichotomy and Sino-American convergence. Available at https://dunia.earth/en/false-dichotomy-and-sino-american-convergence/






