The New Pax Sino-Angloamericana in Latin America and the World

Paper presented at the International Relations Conference, Argentina (November 25, 26, and 27, 2026)

 

Introduction

 

Many observers are closely monitoring what has been referred to since the early 21st century as the relative decline of Western hegemony and the advent of a multipolar world¹. It is a fact that the supremacy consolidated over the last five centuries by powers aligned with the liberal capitalist order has shifted in nature. Concepts such as the “post-Western world²”, the “world order in transition³”, “non-alignment⁴”, or “post-hegemonic regionalism”⁵ have reflected this evolution in academic circles for the past two decades. In Latin America, this evolution tends to be interpreted as a reformulation of the Pax Americana, in line with other power dynamics⁶, and marks the starting point of a new geopolitical era.

This conceptual perspective, however, while it does address various phenomena related to the evolution of globalization and the global power structure, does not—at least to date—incorporate other essential factual foundations linked to a core strategic dimension in the continent’s historical genesis: that of dialectical conflict. This conflictual dynamic—to define it for now schematically in regional terms—involves the orchestrated confrontation between powers vying for the same power superstructure, with the aim of surreptitiously shaping a specific geopolitical space and concealing the underlying programmatic unity. This is a fundamental strategic arena in regional and global history. Its expression at the continental level refers, among other elements, to the art of war known as “divide and conquer”—that is, to forms of instrumentalizing conflict that were implemented from the Spanish conquest through the independence movements of the early nineteenth century⁷ and beyond.

A more thorough examination of the historical and geopolitical landscape at the continental and global levels allows us to visualize the unfolding of this dialectical framework in the Americas over the past five centuries and in the present day. As a result of this broader analysis, the interpretive framework expands considerably and renews both the historical perspective and the nature of contemporary geopolitical dynamics. The disruptive picture that emerges highlights not so much a post-hegemonic or multipolar transition of power as a new unipolar convergence, crystallized in the antagonistic interplay between China and the United States.

 

The Political Nature of China

 

Understanding China is a key starting point for this reflection, as it clearly illustrates the structure we have just introduced. Since the 1990s, the rise of this Asian country has driven a shift in the geopolitical center of gravity toward Asia and changed the face of globalization by becoming a developed industrial hub across all technological and economic sectors⁸. This integration into the ranks of the world’s leading powers is evident in many areas. It marks a turning point in Latin America in terms of commercial, financial, and strategic presence, with Beijing becoming Latin America’s second-largest trading partner around 2010⁹. China now emerges not only as an emerging actor but also as a competitor capable of challenging the international order shaped by the United States since 1945.

The inner workings and historical origins of the Asian giant, however, point to a very different reality. Politically, the creation of the First Republic of China in 1912 is inseparable from the overthrow of its imperial dynasty, coordinated by Great Britain and other European powers. In effect, by 1911, China had become a nation subordinate to the European establishment, and in particular to the British elites. This subordination, inherent to the birth of the First Republic of China, was concealed—even within Chinese society itself—and became a dialectical strategy pivoting on a dual logic. On the one hand, it fostered a series of more or less superficial frictions with Western rivals; on the other, it ensured a structural alignment of the Chinese state apparatus with the British agenda.

More specifically, the formation of the first Republican stronghold in China was precipitated by the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 at the hands of the Triads¹⁰. These groups, along with other criminal organizations such as the Hakkas, were established during the 19th century as a paramilitary arm of Great Britain and as an instrument for the distribution of opiates orchestrated by former British Prime Minister Henry John Temple (or Lord Palmerston), a descendant of Britain’s ruling dynasties. The objective of this subversive scheme, concealed behind the ideological veil of free trade¹¹, was to undermine China’s traditional unity through large-scale drug addiction. The opium trade began in China around 1715, in conjunction with military pressure exerted—with French support—on Chinese ports during the 19th century. The leader Sun Yat-sen, who was a member of the Triads and was trained by the British James Cantlie and Patrick Manson¹², spearheaded the movement to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and sowed the seeds of the Chinese Republic in 1912, with ideological roots shaped by London.

Later, in 1921, political figures Chen Duxiu, Zhang Shenfu, and Li Dazhao founded the Chinese Communist Party under the influence of certain leaders of the Comintern and the British philosopher Bertrand Russell¹³, a descendant of the Medici dynasty. Russell was a proponent of the dialectical philosophy that Moses Hess had passed on to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. He was also the mentor of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai at Yale University’s Beijing campus¹⁴. This dialectical approach aimed to create opposing poles of power in China, whose confrontation would create internal tension, reshape the country’s political landscape, and blur the web of subordination that had trapped the nation. The continued prevalence of this same dialectical scheme today suggests that the Chinese elites¹⁵ remain fully embedded in the decision-making circles of London and Washington.

In fact, the institutional framework that today links China with London and Washington provides further evidence of this structural dependence. Five Chinese organizations serve as a transmission belt to politically steer the “Middle Kingdom” and shape its elites. Indeed, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA¹⁶), the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC¹⁷), the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS¹⁸), and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS¹⁹) are responsible for training and indoctrinating China’s elites, under the supervision of two Anglo-American entities: the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA or Chatham House²⁰) in London and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR²¹) in the United States. The CPIFA, established in 1949, is the highest-ranking organization in China. It is publicly presented as an arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and trains academic experts, politicians, and prominent diplomatic figures, as well as business leaders, according to a relatively public schedule of activities²². Chatham House thus sets the agenda for Chinese policy and that of the Communist Party. At the same time, in 1972, shortly before Deng Xiaoping’s modernization drive, London had launched the Great Britain-China Committee (GBCC²³) with the barely concealed aim of making China a global player: “In time, the Chinese will become a great Power. We must hope that in the process they will acquire the responsibility of a great Power towards the rest of the world. Their conception of time is different from ours. We should not forget the old Chinese saying that the first hundred years of every new dynasty are the worst²⁴.”

Other evidence relates to the rollout of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the creation of the BRICS alliance. The framework for the New Silk Road, which became operational in 2013, was intellectually conceived within the Trilateral Commission and later outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski around the same time that efforts were being made to foster China’s rise as a major industrial power. The American duo, consisting of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, implemented a covert policy to promote the emergence of Deng Xiaoping’s “opening-up” model through technology transfer, industrial restructuring, and China’s integration into the World Trade Organization. In this regard, senior Chinese officials themselves acknowledge²⁵ that the BRICS alliance, formally launched in 2009, was an initiative of James O’Neill, who served as president of Chatham House from 2018 to 2021. In financial terms, since its inception in 2013, global industry and major Anglo-Saxon banks have financed the Belt and Road Initiative to the tune of nearly 10 trillion²⁶ dollars, not counting the participation of Chinese banks.

These factors tend to be highlighted by the current levels of collaboration between Beijing and Washington in the field of technology research and development. Over the past decade, nearly 46,000 scientific articles²⁷ were co-authored by researchers in Beijing and Washington on the topic of artificial intelligence, while Silicon Valley unicorns have been cooperating directly with their counterparts in China²⁸. Other recent reports indicate that U.S. federal research funding has helped advance China’s strategic goals²⁹, particularly in critical technologies in the fields of weapons, artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, and semiconductors. In several respects, these levels of cooperation exceed the collaborative ties observed within the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Various narrative avoidances have been used to obscure this cooperation, including claims about China’s ability to infiltrate or spy on Western industry.

 

The American Ontology

 

The superstructure capable of carrying out this conflict-ridden design in China is not unrelated to the formation of the Americas beginning in the 15th century. The expansion of the New World, beginning with the Spanish conquests, has mobilized this same dialectical framework—with numerous variations—up to the present day. Two long-term dynamics stand out: the shaping of the Spanish-American region as a space controlled by the Romano-British dynasties; and the formation of the United States as an entity subordinate to these same dynasties, destined to become a continental and global power.

In the case of Ibero-America, the close ties between the Spanish and British aristocracies are a central fact and have been a constant throughout history. The lack of analysis of this dimension led to the perception of the expansion of the New World being reduced to a purely Hispanic milestone. It was indeed a milestone in military, demographic, religious, cultural, and infrastructural terms, with Hispanic actors serving as the principal architects of this expansion. But it was not a milestone in ontological and political design terms, since the Hispanic sphere was an undeclared vassal of the London aristocracy. In fact, Spain—whose name derives from the Iberian region of the Roman Empire known as Hispania—was always linked to the sphere of influence of the dynasties that led the creation of the Roman Empire, following the founding of Britannia and New Troy by Brutus in 1200 B.C., which later became Londinium and London. The expeditions to the Americas were carried out by members of the Order of the Temple (Templars³⁰), with Christopher Columbus at the spearhead, with funding from Cosimo de’ Medici³¹ and the Seville branch of the Centurión family³². This order had been formed in the 12th century by the Medici, who descended from the Carolingian line of Charlemagne³³, the founding ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. The first Roman Empire had been founded by Romulus in 750 B.C. from New Troy in Britain, while the Holy Roman Empire was established in the 10th century by the same Romano-British dynasty that founded Britain. In Spain, the kings of Castile, Aragon, Barcelona, León, Navarre, and Portugal were part of Charlemagne’s lineage³⁴. Actually, the European elites constituted a relatively homogeneous and coordinated ethnopolitical circle, resorting to dialectical strategies to conceal this cohesion, exploit conflict to their advantage, and undertake expansionist ventures.

Various sequences illustrate this dialectical interplay. In 1453, the fall of Constantinople at the hands of the Ottoman Empire is staged by both sides to simulate the fall of the Byzantine Roman Empire³⁵. The latter formally ceases to exist, but persists as an informal infrastructure with a nerve center in London. In the religious sphere, the formation of the Society of Jesus within the Catholic Church was spearheaded by Pope Paul III, Alessandro Farnese, with the aim of exploiting the deliberately created conflict with Protestantism and becoming involved in the conquered territories of Latin America³⁶. The Jesuits played a central role in administering a vast territory and facilitating the “social construction” of an Amerindian identity. In the 19th century, the Napoleonic Wars marked a turning point in the cycle of independence in Ibero-America, as well as in its cycle of civil wars. Napoleon upended the military landscape in Europe at a time when the Enlightenment and nationalism were reaching maturity, poised to replace imperial forms of government. The liberal revolution, propagated by national heroes aligned with Freemasonry and the liberal school of thought³⁷, subsequently fragmented Latin America, transforming it into a collection of republics integrated into that order. Finally, closer to the present day, the dialectical framework was deployed after 1945 with the spread across the continent of the Castro-communist revolutionary struggle, which was redefined as “21st-century socialism” after 1990. Most revolutionary factions benefited from the support of Washington and London³⁸, as did the socializing regimes that declared themselves opposed to the capitalist and imperial stance of the United States. These conflicting polarizations made it possible to carry out a genuine political and economic reshaping of Ibero-America, conducted over the long term and through various phases³⁹ (even during periods of democracy), without this more profound strategy being recognized.

In the case of the United States of America, its founding narrative also points to similar elements of the dialectical matrix. Looking back, the creation of the United States from the Thirteen Colonies in 1776 was spearheaded by a handful of Templar revolutionaries⁴⁰ and Freemasons from the Grand Lodge of England⁴¹, whose formation traces back to the Templars’ initiative in 1717⁴². Some of them had been involved in the Virginia Company during the earlier colonization, in direct connection with the great livery companies of London⁴³. The creation of the federation of states was thus anchored to England, in particular to the Romano-British headquarters⁴⁴ known as The Crown Temple, formed in 1185 at the initiative of the Medici. The Treaty of Paris officially ratified this dependency in 1783, along with the incorporation of Roman law⁴⁵ into the constitutional framework that took shape between 1787 and 1789. This treaty has not been amended or repealed to date, while successive episodes of civil war were orchestrated as dialectical conflicts in which each opposing side was supported by London⁴⁶.

In ethnopolitical terms, George Washington descends from the line of the Duke of Lancaster and William I of England, while Thomas Jefferson and James Madison come from the dynastic line of Edward III of England; both lines are part of the British upper echelons. Alexander Hamilton was a member of the Order of the Temple and founded the first bank of the United States in 1791, affiliated with the London-based headquarters⁴⁷. In fact, England continued to provide structural financing to the United States from 1776 to 1914⁴⁸, and subsequently until 1945—far beyond any intention to reduce Washington’s dominance.

In the early 20th century, the British founded the Pilgrims Society with the aim of fostering an Anglophile alliance between the American and British elites⁴⁹. Other circles that were formed included the Rhodes-Milner Circle and Skull & Bones⁵⁰. The Rockefeller, Schiff, Warburg, Morgan, Aldrich, Mandell House, Taft, Roosevelt, Wilson, and Henry Ford families were part of this network of British influence in Washington, creating a structure similar to the one we described in the case of China. These families, along with Edward Mandell House and William Wiseman—then head of British MI6 in the United States—coordinated the financial destabilization in 1913 that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve⁵¹ (FED). In hierarchical terms, the most significant entity in the Americas was and remains the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), whose conception stemmed from the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, driven by the circle formed by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, as well as by Edward Mandell House⁵² of the Fabian Society. Founded a year after Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations thus became the United States’ guiding force and played a central role in making the country a continental and global power⁵³.

This modus operandi—closely combining the generation of crises and conflicts, the design of the international system, and the framing of elites—followed a logic that was both overarching and infrastructural. It unfolded, on the one hand, through control over nation-states from an ethnopolitical power center located in London, and on the other, through the design of rules and mechanisms within the emerging international system. Within this framework, the genesis of the contemporary international system—with the United States playing a leading role—has a long conceptual history. It is guided primarily by various monist and materialist philosophical currents, notably those of Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Paul Carus, Alexander Bogdanov, Hermann Cohen, and Karl Marx. It was fueled above all in the late 19th century by a group of Anglo-Saxon thinkers within the framework of the project that some Britons called the “Third British Empire⁵⁴”, namely the conception of a global network capable of projecting Roman-British interests into the rules of the international system⁵⁵. In terms of power, this project marked a transition from pure colonial domination to an abstract architecture that operated through economic and cognitive control via a network of economic governance mechanisms and monetary stabilization plans. In this way, London discreetly positioned itself at the center of a system in which decisions would be “embedded” in technical standards and expert consensus. The Royal Institute of International Affairs is the organization at the epicenter of this architecture. It drew upon the conceptual work of Alfred Zimmern, Lionel Curtis⁵⁶, Bertrand Russell, and George Bernard Shaw⁵⁷. By the late 19th century, these authors understood that dominance could be reshaped through covert functionalism—that is, through an international matrix governed by a programmatic framework equipped with common rules and procedures. The initial foundations of this system were outlined by Leonard Woolf⁵⁸ and were later incorporated into the League of Nations in 1919, along with the first set of international organizations established in the wake of World War I. John Maynard Keynes completed this framework⁵⁹ in the macroeconomic sphere, ultimately leading to the modern architecture agreed upon at Bretton Woods in 1944⁶⁰.

In the two specific cases of China and the Americas, it is worth noting that this expanded framework has gone unrecognized by most Latin American historians and strategists. This lack of awareness can be explained by at least two causal factors. First, because it is a covert framework that constructs a dual reality and erases the traces of its maneuvers. This secrecy is achieved by establishing a duality—that is, by fabricating a reality in which two (or more) logics that link the events can coexist. The orthodox interpretation of these events, as seen through a classical materialist lens, is guided by the frictions and power dynamics that actually exist on the scene, but which conceal an orchestrated and reified scheme. Another heterodox version, one of greater depth and secrecy, works precisely through the orchestration of actors and the fragmentation of the strategic landscape.

Second, because this architecture constantly works to shape perceptions and skew interpretive frameworks across a very broad spectrum, encompassing the fields of ontologies and knowledge production⁶¹. Both the Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House in London, as well as many other like-minded organizations, thus produce bodies of doctrine, conceptual frameworks, and training networks at the continental level that cement these biases according to a logic of cognitive encirclement⁶².

 

Dialectical Geometry

 

China and the United States are thus part of a dialectical framework that operates within the same strategic unity orchestrated by the Roman-British superstructure. For the former, the mission assigned today is to increase its power and challenge the monopoly of power built by the liberal axis since 1945. For the latter, the goal is to relatively reduce its role as an international arbiter and maintain its role as a defender of liberal-democratic institutions. Recent cases involving Ukraine, Venezuela, and the war in Iran illustrate this. In this context, it is important to emphasize that China was not established in 1911 to serve as an effective counterweight to the liberal capitalist bloc. Nor was it driven to wage a genuine ideological or geoeconomic battle against its adversaries. The evidence shows that it was conceived to establish a new geopolitical power and an industrial platform capable of gradually matching and surpassing the United States. Through the communist system, its identitarian and ideological foundation cemented a state-socialist variant that ultimately led to the same monopolistic structure as the liberal capitalist model, although there are naturally many operational nuances between the two models. This brings us back to the very point of ideological genesis that we have pointed out—one that forged both the liberal framework and its supposed alternative, embodied in socialism and Marxism.

Following the period of normalization after the Cold War and the geoeconomic growth linked to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, a cycle of tensions began between Beijing and Washington. The trade dispute initiated by Donald Trump’s first administration beginning in 2017—through tariff barriers, technology restrictions (Huawei, semiconductors), and other sanctions—coincided with the designation of China as a strategic competitor. This led to a containment effort that continued during Joe Biden’s Democrats administration and has intensified during the current Republican administration. Naturally, the current situation coincides with an agenda of mounting tensions, accompanied by a certain degree of fragmentation within the framework of managed friction between the two powers.
Three disruptive consequences arise from this dialectical scenario. The first is that this framework invalidates the existence of a transition in the international order outside the unipolar and hegemonic framework. This post-hegemonic transition exists in certain layer of international relations in the case of the United States. But it does not exist across the full spectrum of power at the level of the superstructure that governs both nations. The unipolarity that crystallized in U.S. power during the 20th century served the goal of shaping the international system and concealing the overarching dominance of the superstructure that governed both Beijing and Washington and drew them into a dialectical arena. The two powers are embedded in this structure, which curtails their political nature and sovereignty. Therefore, they lack geopolitical autonomy and are instrumentalized within the framework of a fundamentally dual international order. This duality remains fully in effect insofar as there have been no overt attempts—from the time of their republican origins to the present day, on the part of the elites of the United States and China—to break or expose this tutelary dependence. What appears to be bipolarity is in reality related to a pattern of managed frictions, which are effective and can even be violent, but do not undermine the underlying programmatic unity.

Apolarity and multipolarity are also invalid concepts and help to obscure the same dialectical framework. These two concepts are even more anachronistic given that Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa—members of the BRICS—are also powers dominated by the same superstructure (we cannot delve deeper into this topic due to the limited length of this text). Within this framework, bipolar equilibrium consists of generating a dynamic of friction in which the level of confrontation is modulated according to the strategic goals pursued by the superstructure, its ultimate expression being either direct open conflict or indirect conflicts waged through allies. A retrospective analysis indicates, however, that open or all-out conflict tends not to be the primary goal in this type of maneuver, which is instead aimed at exploiting conflict with a view toward reconfiguration and dominance.

The second consequence is that the dual nature of this agenda—brought about by the introduction of “two intertwined realities,” one fabricated and apparent, the other true and secret—constitutes the strategic mechanism that allows for both the disorientation and alignment of other actors around a single programmatic roadmap. Indeed, the superficial framework created by this architecture reveals both a web of interdependencies (Chinamérica⁶³) and a web of growing competition between the two powers. We have emphasized that certain elements of competition exist, highlighted since the 2010s by China’s rhetorically more defiant stance. The concealment of the deeper agenda thus allows other actors to become ensnared in a false perceptual dichotomy. This dichotomy not only creates a perceptual bias but also makes it impossible to conceptually interpret the strategic dynamics in depth and the nature of the competing actors, leaving national elites in a state of intrinsic disorientation. An example of this in Ibero-America today lies in the fact that the main approaches to international integration and the Sino-American duopoly revolve around three broad models of integration: liberal Americanism, multipolar and pragmatic opportunism, and autonomous, non-aligned regionalism. Any of these three frameworks ultimately serves the dialectical scheme described above. The third, in principle, could be synonymous with a lower degree of dependence. But it tends to overlook the infrastructure of dominance encoded in the rules of the international system after 1945, and above all the cognitive dependence that is deeply rooted within the countries of the region, which allows behaviors to be aligned with the tutelary superstructure.

Finally, the third consequence relates to the reformulation of “Westphalian” grammar. The conceptual framework of international relations approaches the transnational space as a dynamic flow of interests pursued by strategic units that rival, cooperate, and confront one another. The superstructural level we describe undermines part of this logic and redefines it. This also applies to the political and economic spheres, in that any organizational structure can be designed in a dual manner to conceal part of its operations. In other words, Washington and Beijing do not pursue purely power-enhancing or power-projection policies rooted in their national and identity-based frameworks. Their actions combine overt and covert logics that constantly alter the transparency of the strategic landscape. Thus, China and the United States, like other states, carry out their power projections by essentially responding to the interests of the London superstructure. This implies a considerable broadening of the ontological and conceptual spectrum of international relations. Since this broadening is currently absent in academic or governmental circles, a significant conceptual disconnect has emerged that ultimately favors the dominant agenda.
Unipolar Convergence

The shift in the balance of power observable on the global stage over the past four decades or so thus points to a dialectical design orchestrated by the Roman-British superstructure. Now, what purpose might this shift in geometry serve? What might be the ultimate or intermediate goals of this dialectical scheme and its underlying trajectory? These are not easy questions to answer, as they involve implicit and speculative elements. Nevertheless, certain aspects can be examined in light of both the long history and the current situation.

First, there are a number of factors that point to a programmatic convergence in the agendas of each geopolitical bloc. On the one hand, the states that adopted socializing capitalism during the last century have maintained a level of state control and adherence to international agreements on climate and development (Agenda 2030, Sustainable Development Goals). In fact, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—along with India, Brazil, South Africa, and other Western countries—promote a vision of governance compatible with the framework established by the Bretton Woods institutions. This vision is grounded in the idea of joint stewardship of the planet, which is viewed as being in a state of ecological crisis and in urgent need of a regulatory order. On the other hand, the concept of protecting the “common good”—present in the Chinese vision through the idea of a “global community of shared future” and in the Western vision through the notion of a “sustainable world”—bolsters the legitimacy of a co-managed global order⁶⁴. In this context, crises are addressed in both camps as a privileged—and covert—means of imposing rules on society from above⁶⁵, which brings us directly back to the dialectical framework discussed above. The restructuring necessary to move toward this shared order relies both on conflict and on modes of governance and development that entail a qualitative advance in terms of control and integration among sectoral policies.

Second, the dialectical cooperation between Beijing and Washington is shaping a Pax Americana in transition toward a Pax Sino-Anglo-Americana, against the backdrop of the aforementioned convergence. This Sino-American condominium actually existed long before, as both powers had been working toward a common agenda since the first quarter of the 20th century. But the current shift in the overall landscape and in China’s geopolitical weight is creating a new balance. China is emerging more firmly as a challenger to the liberal order, capable of forging alliances across the entire political spectrum in Latin America. Beginning in the 1970s, China assumed the role of a new global industrial hub with the aim of establishing itself as a pseudo-antagonistic pole to London and Washington, leading, since the 2000s, to major global initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (1996), the Silk Road (2013), the Global Security Initiative (2022), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2023). On the “rival” side, the United States had established a hemispheric Pax Americana beginning with the Spanish-American War in 1898 and James Monroe’s hemispheric projection⁶⁶. With China’s rise, Washington showed signs of strategic “distraction”⁶⁷ and an acceleration of its own decline⁶⁸. The political-military fiasco following the 2003 military adventure in the Middle East consolidated this trend⁶⁹. It is even possible to identify a deliberate reduction in U.S. influence in Ibero-America in favor of China. In fact, Washington covertly favored China’s expansion in the region, with three particularly telling cases in Panama⁷⁰, Brazil⁷¹, and Argentina⁷². This covert interplay between the two powers ultimately forged a perceptual environment that accelerated the transition toward a Sino-Anglo-American balance against the backdrop of a pseudo-supremacist stance by Washington during the last Republican administrations.

The fact that Beijing and Washington are both subject to the same ethnopolitical superstructure suggests that this balance primarily reflects a geopolitical adjustment between the two powers. China has expanded its presence in Latin America thanks to its expansionist agenda and through direct U.S. collaboration, which has been accompanied by an intentional reduction in U.S. dominance. The current realignment of the monetary system—in terms of de-dollarization, the decline of the petrodollar, and the ongoing financial crisis—is part of this shift toward Asia. Beijing’s influence has not yet matched that of Washington, but it clearly marks a turning point in terms of financial, commercial, and, consequently, political clout⁷³. The hemispheric landscape taking shape is thus that of a Sino-Anglo-American condominium that brings to the fore a new horizon of exploitation and programmatic convergence.

The internal reality of Latin American countries reflects this strategic pattern. Brazil, whose elites remain deeply influenced by Washington⁷⁴, has become politically polarized between sectors that draw a rhetorical dichotomy between China and Washington but develop concrete ties with both powers. In Argentina, the liberal-leaning government that took office in 2023 did not constitute a real alternative to the country’s socialist framework and works in concert with both China and the United States⁷⁵, in contrast to a polarizing narrative. Mexico⁷⁶, Nicaragua⁷⁷, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Chile also exhibit similar polarized scenarios⁷⁸ and are being pushed—due to economic opportunities or Washington’s active passivity—to participate in the Chinese agenda⁷⁹, while continuing to depend on Washington. Positions of nonalignment with respect to the Sino-Anglo-American condominium exist at the discursive level. But the extent of these contradictions indicates, for now, that they are fully integrated into the dialectical framework we have described.

 

Conclusion

 

Many factors indicate that a new historical phase is taking hold in Latin America. The region’s diminished geopolitical relevance in a global landscape increasingly centered on Asia, coupled with the relative retreat of the United States and the expansion of China, has transformed the continental landscape. The emerging landscape is not that of a multipolar arena capable of offering proportionally new growth opportunities for the Ibero-American region. The current phase is synonymous with an accelerating unipolar era, advancing under the cognitive veil of a “pressing bipolarity”. This unipolar phase is offensive in that it works on two fronts to introduce destabilization into the regional and global arena and to deepen a matrix of predation and control.

Ultimately, this landscape is not so much a break with long-term historical dynamics. The in-depth analysis we have conducted underscores a historical continuity in the architecture of power that is truly unprecedented at the strategic level. However, there are indeed new elements at the upper echelon of the geostrategic landscape where a rebalancing of influence between China and the United States is clearly evident.

One of the major—and, if you will, tragic—issues, however, remains the lack of awareness of this geometry. Therein lies precisely one of the core aspects of this strategic art. People fail to realize that the construction of China and the Western world as two allied yet seemingly rival blocs is the result of a geopolitical design. The formation of the New World was essentially the product of this strategic art, shaped by the Roman-British power core. The same occurred later in China, at the time of its republican modernization in 1911⁸⁰, which was instrumentalized to build a new industrial platform at the expense of curtailing the industrialization of other developed (European) or developing countries. Both yesterday and today, the strategic intelligence produced in many governmental and academic circles leaves this architecture “orphaned” in terms of conceptual and explanatory resources. This framework, which constantly operates on the basis of an artificial compartmentalization between the distorted image of the global chessboard and the actual agenda of the great powers, remains an “unidentified object.” This compartmentalization fragments our understanding of reality, ultimately preventing us from discerning the true nature of the strategic game. Consequently, most actors operating in the realm of international relations, although they understand certain dimensions of cognitive warfare, fail to unravel this web and interpret visible frictions as if they were a faithful expression of geopolitical reality. This disorientation pushes them outside the actual strategic contest and further perpetuates the mental containment designed by the architects of the system.

 

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26. That is, 10 billions USD, equivalent to one-tenth of the world’s gross domestic product in a year.
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28. Silicon Valley’s Other China Problem: It’s Training Their AI https://www.forbes.com/sites/annatong/2026/08/05/silicon-valleys-other-china-problem-its-training-their-ai/
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63. Quote from historian Niall Ferguson.
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72. Speroni, I. (2026). Camarada Lul Mi Lei. Available at https://restaurarg.blogspot.com/2026/04/el-camarada-lul-mi-lei.html
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74. Haines, G.K. (1997). Americanization of Brazil – A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945–1954. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
75. Speroni, I. (2026). Ibid.
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77. Farah, D., Meléndez, J. (2026). Por qué Nicaragua es una amenaza hemisférica. Expediente Abierto. Available at https://expedienteabierto.org/por-que-nicaragua-es-una-amenaza-hemisferica/
78. Aróstica, P., Sánchez, W. (2019). Ibid.
79. Albright, Z., Telias, D., Long, T. (2025). Latin American small states in the Belt and Road Initiative: Narrating status amidst U.S.-China tensions. In Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2026.2637109
80. In fact, much earlier, dating back to the time of the Mongols.