The Great Sahel Game

 

Case study developed following the webinar “The AES and the New Strategic Landscape in Africa,” hosted in August 2026 by Niofar IE Afrique, a community of economic intelligence professionals.

 

Introduction

 

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) remains on course after three years of existence in a region of the Sahel where the bulk of extremist violence¹ in Africa is concentrated. Formed in September 2023 in the wake of the coups d’état that struck this same geographic region, it was initially established as a defensive agreement aimed at curbing the destabilization of Sahelian states. After coming to power, the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger quickly restructured their external partnerships with France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They initiated cooperation with other powers (Russia, Turkey, China) and aligned themselves with a heterodox political bloc. Now presenting itself as an “African solution to African problems,” the AES promotes nationalist, sovereignist, decolonial, and even confederal perspectives², crystallizing a much more political perspective on its project and new expectations on the part of the populations. The security issue—though far from resolved³ —has thus expanded into the societal and economic spheres, creating a dynamic capable of altering the political and economic status quo in West Africa.

Various analyses have attempted to account for this regionalist approach in media and academic circles⁴. Beyond the interpretations offered, however, a more in-depth analysis reveals a very different side to this conflict-ridden environment. The new Sahelian regimes are, in fact, not breaking free from their tutelary dependence on the former European powers. The security response, as well as the original threat itself, are in fact part of the same strategic architecture constructed by these powers and the Sahelian elites with the aim of reconfiguring the subregion. This plan, particularly emblematic of contemporary conflict, is not fully grasped due to its stealthy nature and the cognitive barriers erected by the protagonists, hence the imperative for in-depth analysis of the interpretive frameworks.

 

Libyan Metastases and the Strategic Framework

 

The 2011 Libyan crisis has indeed upended the fragile security balance in the Sahel region. Some African leaders have pointed to it as a direct consequence of NATO’s adventurism⁵, as the violent overthrow of the Tripoli government in 2011 provided an opening for jihadist and separatist movements to rush into the gaps left by Saharan states and other regions of the Middle East. The armed and insurgent factions that were strengthened by the events in Libya have indeed spread throughout the subregion as well as into Syria⁶. Insurgent movements have at times been linked to the discretionary maneuvers of external actors, particularly France, which continues to be accused today of supporting rebel groups in Mali⁷, even though it cooperated militarily from 2014 to 2023 to halt the expansion of armed groups through Operations Serval and Barkhane, conducted alongside the G5 Sahel⁸.

In the decade following the Arab Spring and the fall of Tripoli, the strategic narrative that emerged in the Sahel tended to focus on three priority areas: the territorial expansion of irregular groups—perceived to varying degrees as having ties to external powers—which reignited internal tensions and threatened the territorial integrity of Sahelian states; the inertia of the African ruling class and governance models that ultimately limited the ability to break free from the security quagmire and the lag in modernization, including in the area of counterterrorism; and the contradictions within the international system and West African integration that hindered efforts to promote social cohesion in Sahelian societies and limit their fragmentation. These themes broadly formed the underlying framework for the initiatives that were subsequently undertaken regarding partnerships for counterterrorism, regime change through military coups in the three AES countries (as well as in Chad and Sudan), the creation of the tripartite alliance, its compelling narratives, and the political rifts with the West African political community.

Such a framework, while seemingly logical and realistic, is nevertheless incomplete. It overlooks entire aspects of reality that prove more difficult to discern and that have, moreover, been glossed over or overlooked by the intelligence agencies of the powers involved, including those of the Sahelian countries. Yet such a gap in perception is not a circumstantial or marginal phenomenon in the Sahelian arena. It reveals the existence of a balance of power constructed in the cognitive realm, with the aim of obscuring a comprehensive understanding of the issues at stake and the nature of the arena in question.

 

Revisiting the Sahelian Arena

 

Three key phases allow us to deconstruct this cognitive barrier and fundamentally reframe the Sahelian strategic arena: the shift in neocolonial dominance in Africa after 1945 and Libya’s role up to 2011; the phase of destabilization in Sahelian countries after 2011; and the current initiative of the Alliance of Sahelian States.

The Neocolonial Shift After 1945

Libya, in fact, plays a dual role as both architect and catalyst in this context. The experiment led by Muammar Gaddafi beginning in 1969 has most often been portrayed as an autocratic, pro-African regime that rejected the liberal foundations of the West⁹ in favor of an autonomous, socialist model. In reality, on the one hand, Tripoli supported the continent’s national liberation initiatives and the prospects for continental convergence, helping to bring about the establishment of the African Union during the 2000s. On the other hand, Gaddafi’s doctrinal framework introduced the concept of a political “third way,” distinguishing itself from both communist and capitalist models¹⁰ and from state and private modes of management. In essence, this model shifted the governance of flows and decisions toward other mechanisms of arbitration and resource allocation, following a monopolistic framework compatible with the matrix provided by Karl Marx, Wilhelm Röpke¹¹, or, more recently, by Tony Blair¹². In other words, the goal of this model was not institutional or economic modernization capable of transcending the limitations of the two classical models, but rather an increase in dependencies and the monopoly of power¹³, formulated within a framework that—like orthodox models—intrinsically decoupled the system’s officially stated objectives from its actual functioning. This same framework was introduced into variants of Arab and African socialism, particularly in Nasserism, Syrian or Iraqi Ba’athism, and later elsewhere in Chinese Dengism¹⁴. The European Union and other national initiatives¹⁵ drew heavily on it, as did the African Union.

This supposedly alternative framework was in reality part of the transition from European colonialism to a new infrastructure of dependencies, this time codified in the rules of the international system and reinforced by the control of national elites. This transformation took ideological shape during the19thcentury, under the leadership of British elites—on the one hand, thanks to the works of Karl Marx, which were guided by Moses Hess and Giuseppe Mazzini¹⁶ ; on the other hand, through Wilhelm Röpke, who championed the emergence of the “third model” and the neoliberal school with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation¹⁷. Fundamentally, the conceptual development of historical materialism—as well as that of capitalism and communism—served the purpose of creating a balance of power between antagonistic forces, including social classes, and of harnessing the dialectical tension between these opposing poles to shape the economic landscape.

It was within this ideological framework that Muammar Gaddafi was trained in London under the auspices of the Foreign Office¹⁸, and later in Taiwan at the School of Political Warfare (Fu Hsing Kang College¹⁹). The military leaders of the Free Union in Libya drew inspiration from the Nasserist experience, which was supported by the CIA as part of the “Fat Fucker” program²⁰. The methodology employed by the military liberators quickly spread throughout the region—to Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), and Libya (1969)—with each coup d’état resulting in a similar modus operandi, namely: the establishment of a socializing framework presented as a political “third way” in opposition to the colonial past; the creation of a single-party system accompanied by people’s assemblies²¹ ; and the nationalization of resources. While facing repression by military apparatuses and various forms of destabilization, the national liberation movements were in fact supported behind the scenes by the former colonial powers, with incidental assistance from Cuban Castro-communism, whose first leader was none other than another ally of the Anglo-American establishment²². This same establishment could also count on African allies. In Ghana, one of the founders of the republic, Edward Akuffo-Addo, was a member of the highest echelons of the British establishment (Middle Temple²³). In fact, he pushed the country to become actively involved in the Bandung “Non-Aligned Movement” (1955), which was presented as a force in apparent break with the European colonial era. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was a Freemason supported by the British MI6²⁴ with the aim of leading the anti-apartheid movement and integrating the country into the emerging system of dependencies. One thing leading to another, most of the continent’s Marxist leaders were thus supported by Anglo-American decision-making centers, with the tacit approval or direct backing of other European powers.

During this transition from one system to another, the new African republics established between 1950 and 1960 put in place new mechanisms for institutional standardization. This was the case with the network of organizations associated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), which has since provided guidance to African elites²⁵ and shaped their policies within each national context. The creation of central banks²⁶ and the centralization of the banking sector were other mechanisms that enabled control over economic flows through inclusion (or exclusion) in the international financial network, as well as economic conditionality. In West Africa, the Central Bank of West African States embodies this role as a clearinghouse at the subregional level²⁷. Guinea, moreover, refused to join this system coordinated by France and suffered economic repercussions as a result²⁸. Conversely, China’s entry into the network in 1996²⁹ coincided with its economic takeoff. More recently in Libya, the rebels who seized Benghazi in 2011 immediately established a central bank as well as an associated oil company³⁰. The same strategy was replicated in Iraq, Serbia, Ukraine, and Syria—which joined the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) network in 2024³¹ following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime³². Only Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa are currently full members of the BIS, with most sub-Saharan countries cooperating seamlessly with it. Finally, it is worth noting that the African Union, through its Agenda 2063³³, aligns with this framework by explicitly promoting the creation of banking governance mechanisms or other regulatory instruments that directly echo this new structure of dependencies.

Libya thus served as a sort of catalyst for the regional order that took shape in the postcolonial period. It staged a center of dissent against European hegemony—masked behind a false antagonism—in order to lay the foundations for a new system of subordination for African and Middle Eastern states. Tripoli also contributed to destabilizing the Sahelian countries by establishing, prior to 2011, an Islamist platform capable of fueling border conflicts. The overthrow of the Tripoli regime was described by many critics of Western-oriented policies as a NATO intervention that toppled a pan-African regime. It is indeed undeniable that Operation “Odyssey Dawn,” authorized by the five members of the UN Security Council under the pretext of protecting the population of Benghazi, exceeded its mandate and was ultimately intended to determine the fate of the Libyan regime. Nevertheless, such a narrow interpretation contributes to the cognitive containment built around the Libyan case and substantially undermines the depth of this arena. The five powers of the Security Council do not act within the compartmentalized framework of their national sovereignty and are in fact controlled by London³⁴, which implies that the unanimous goal of the operation was, from the outset, to overthrow the Gaddafi regime and, eventually, to create a source of instability in the subregion. The maneuvers undertaken at the same time by Jeffrey Epstein³⁵ involving the laundering of Libyan funds tend to confirm this plan³⁶.

 

The Destabilization of the Sahel After 2011

The Libyan crisis, which spread to parts of Africa beginning in 2011, is not isolated from the architecture of influence we discussed earlier. The year 2011 was the year of the Arab Spring. Protests began in Tunisia in December 2010, then spread to Libya in January 2011, followed by Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. The National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed in Libya in February 2011 in the city of Benghazi. It comprised a loose coalition of mercenaries and armed groups concentrated primarily in Benghazi itself and in the areas of Tobruk and Derna. Most of these forces were affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the two entities that provided the main contingent of jihadists in the Iraqi theater³⁷³⁸. The Islamist leader Abdelhakim Belhadj, who served on the Benghazi Transitional Council and later on the Tripoli Military Council, was supported by MI6³⁹ and Qatar⁴⁰, while France supplied equipment to various armed groups⁴¹. MI6 and the CIA, also present on the ground⁴², had in fact sponsored the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group a few years earlier⁴³.

Along the way, these organizations became the linchpin of an insurgent force challenging Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. They were openly supported by NATO’s military actions in March 2011 and ultimately led to the regime’s definitive downfall in October 2011. Most analyses of the terrorist phenomenon have gone to great lengths to compartmentalize the relationships between these irregular groups and their patron powers. French officer Pierre-Henri Buel, for example, courageously highlighted the evidence that the phantom organization Al-Qaeda⁴⁴ was fabricated to legitimize the war on terrorism beginning in 2001, while attributing its origins exclusively to the U.S. agenda. British journalist Mark Curtis, for his part, exposed the incestuous relationships between national intelligence agencies, governments, and Islamist organizations mobilized in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. These two authors, however, along with many others, deliberately glossed over the depth of this issue. In reality, the vast majority of Islamist groups were sponsored by a handful of powers—falsely portrayed as competing with one another—whose hierarchical coordination was ensured by British intelligence⁴⁵ and the Romano-British establishment⁴⁶. This same establishment shaped a superstructure, formed over a long historical process, that oversees the infrastructure of dependencies mentioned above. Like other previous initiatives, this one has shaped a new insurrectionary phenomenon, embodied this time in Islamist movements (Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc.), whose intellectual origins date back to the18thcentury and which are exploited today as a vehicle for destabilization. To this end, the same superstructure has introduced a compartmentalization into interstate relations and the cognitive sphere that renders this strategic landscape invisible. This stealth now allows Russia, China⁴⁷, and Turkey to actively intervene in the Sahel region and build influence there, while being positioned as an alternative to Western influence.

The tensions affecting Sahelian states since 2011 are thus linked to a covert strategy aimed at destabilizing Africa through extremist splinter groups. This strategy operates dialectically, by fomenting insurrectionary networks on the one hand, and supporting efforts toward regime change by political or military forces on the other. In October 2017—well before the “belt of coups” and the formation of the Sahelian Alliance—the Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger was likely coordinated between U.S. intelligence and fighters from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)⁴⁸. This incident served to justify an increased security presence to replace the former French military presence. Against the backdrop of “shared common values⁴⁹,” the United States also trained Sahelian troops and the officers who carried out the coups⁵⁰, notably Assimi Goita in Mali⁵¹ and Ibrahim Traoré⁵² in Burkina Faso⁵³. European Union training missions also participated in this training as part of the fight against terrorism⁵⁴. Finally, regarding irregular groups, it is worth noting that various observers have pointed to funds received by Boko Haram and the Islamic State⁵⁵ from the U.S. agency USAID.

 

The Alliance of Sahel States

The Alliance of Sahel States was founded in this context in September 2023. Initially established as a security pact⁵⁶, it expanded into a confederation project⁵⁷ a few months later, shortly after the withdrawal of three countries from the West African bloc (ECOWAS)58 . The project was not challenged by either France or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which initially resisted the initiative but did not respond with an intervention similar to the one carried out in The Gambia in 201759 . After September 2023, security partnerships with Turkey and Russia60 expanded to include the three countries of the tripartite alliance6162 , without Ankara’s well-known support for Islamic movements being viewed as problematic. In the wake of this, in October 2023, France quickly withdrew its troops deployed in the region63 , unlike the United States, whose forces remained in place64 and would subsequently increase their presence. As part of this same realignment, various regional programs integrated into the World Health Organization’s One Health health surveillance framework65 (RESAOLAB and Labo2S) curiously accelerated their preparations66 even before the July 2023 coup in Niger and announced that they were operational67 . These initiatives remained intact after the formation of the AES, whereas in the energy sector, uranium exports to France were suddenly halted68 .

In terms of economic policy, the AES countries subsequently initiated an initial shift characterized by endogenous and nationalization-oriented policies. This led to the creation of the Confederal Investment and Development Bank (BCID-AES69 ), the standardization of customs duties, digital identity management, as well as a number of nationalizations in the mining sector70 . Despite the fragile security situation, the bloc posted average growth of approximately 5.5% in 2025, with forecasts remaining high relative to the sub-Saharan average71 . During the same period, intra-AES and intra-ECOWAS trade did not show any substantial change, remaining at around 12% of West African trade7273 .

On the informational and political fronts, the AES quickly embraced an aggressive and polarizing agenda, championing a pan-African, sovereignist camp opposed to Euro-Atlantic hegemony and other historical forces that have exerted dominance over African societies, notably the Arab-Muslim conquests7475 . This informational activism is underpinned by a veritable media ecosystem, bolstered by the creation in late 2025 of a dedicated television channel (Télé AES76 ). The narratives generally converge on promoting a multipolar geopolitical order, rejecting neocolonialism77 while distancing themselves from social Marxism. France is accused of supporting rebel groups or Islamic terrorism—an argument that is not entirely unfounded, as we have seen above78 , but one that should be more solidly substantiated, lest it fuel the perceptual compartmentalization of the arena. A similar claim can be made regarding the historical episodes of Muslim conquest, insofar as these took place in a dialectical partnership with the Roman Empire (and not against Rome79 ). Added to this critical analysis is a critique of the institutions of the international system—notably the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union—as well as NATO and the CIA in their role of covert destabilization. In this regard, ECOWAS and neighboring countries are portrayed as following the same tendency toward alignment with the camp of dependency. Within the pan-African sphere supportive of the AES, various sectors—ranging from anti-establishment to anti-imperialist movements—promote military juntas in the media for their break with the orthodox order and their support for a security policy deemed consistent. This is the case with Russia, which has developed a distinctly anti-Western policy of influence80 . The information war waged by Moscow81 is, however, countered by a local and international information sub-ecosystem that challenges Russia’s presence in the region and the criminal activities carried out by Moscow’s parastatal organizations (Africa Corps, Wagner). This tension, which is part of a dialectical pattern, contributes to further polarizing the Sahelian arena and obscuring the deeper layers of its architecture.

Overall, this informational landscape bears the hallmarks of an information war82 far more than a simple media confrontation between the opposing camps. The organization of planned offensive campaigns on both sides, astroturfing, propaganda and its respective exposure, disinformation, and perceptual polarization are among the primary modes of confrontation. A superficial interpretation of this arena tends to draw two main battle lines between the governments of the AES on one side and domestic and foreign critics on the other. In fact, the majority of existing analyses follow this trend8384 . But the dialectical nature of the arena fundamentally precludes reasoning within this simplistic framework. It even subverts the very purpose of information warfare. The information conflicts drawn between Russia, France, the United States, and the three countries of the tripartite alliance exist not with the aim of establishing genuine power dynamics or ensuring one side’s victory over the other, but rather primarily to create a perceptual smokescreen and mask the underlying strategy of tension. In this sense, the fabrication of conflict within this arena is coherent and attests to the fact that France, the United States, Russia, and the Sahelian states are working in concert to establish this dialectical approach and create a cognitive smokescreen for a deeper agenda. This strategy is the opposite of what is dramatized in the information sphere: it is driven by a unified, non-compartmentalized framework and therefore requires, in terms of understanding the situation, that one position oneself within the strategic verticality of the geopolitical chessboard and construct an alternative polemological framework.

 

Conclusion

 

The three phases we have just discussed offer particularly rich strategic insights at the African level. The Sahel subregion—which ranks among the most disadvantaged in terms of its integration into globalization and its exposure to contemporary Islamist violence—entered a new geopolitical cycle following the pivotal years of 2011–2012. Despite appearances, the pact sealed in 2023 within the tripartite alliance does not coincide with a new endogenous security initiative implemented by military juntas determined to break with the previous model. In reality, the three countries of the new Sahelian bloc are mimicking the subregion’s security recovery, as well as its economic revitalization, within what is described as a “third political way.” This project draws on certain conceptual tools (the “third way”) and narratives (post-neocolonialism, Pan-Africanism, independence). It has yielded some positive economic results, while the security equation remains far from resolved. Fundamentally, the agenda being pursued and the nature of the actors involved create a dynamic that is steering the three countries toward subordination to external interests and a reconfiguration of the regional order.

The lack of clarity regarding this structure is a key finding of our analysis. This new Sahelian arena is difficult to grasp because it is fundamentally dual in nature, in the sense that it appears to be an endogenous, “pan-Africanist” politico-military response, while in reality it masks a form of external interventionism. Upstream, the security problem—caused by the intensification of insurgencies and the territorial proliferation of Islamist splinter groups—has been fueled largely by the situation in Libya and external interests, whereas the subsequent security response—embodied in the overthrow of governments and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States—served to facilitate a takeover by military juntas and a realignment of the three countries within the AES. The shift toward new partnerships with the entry of Russia and Turkey is also part of this dialectical mechanism. These two countries, like the United States85 , France, and even China86 , are part of the same geopolitical globalism orchestrated by the Romano-British establishment. The dialectical arena also completely alters the nature of the enemy. For the peoples of the Sahel, the enemy is not so much any one specific actor—such as the military juntas, France, Russia, Islamist factions, etc.—but rather the entire conflict environment itself, and in particular its architects. The arena thus creates an optical illusion that makes camps appear to be in pseudo-opposition, an effect made all the more powerful by the absence of a historical description of this strategic framework in scholarly literature and the media. Finally, action in the cognitive realm—through altered ontologies, false dichotomies, biased knowledge production, media flows, etc.—constantly obscures the true line of confrontation by establishing simplistic and secondary power dynamics. The result of this dialectic is ultimately a failure on the part of Sahelian societies to perceive this conflict-ridden environment and a hindrance to the emergence of alternative forces or resistance movements.

The second perspective concerns the objectives pursued by this architecture. One of the operational principles applied in this Sahelian “grand game” is to use the conflict created by rebel and Islamist factions to legitimize regime change and a programmatic shift in West Africa. This programmatic agenda intensified and became more radical with the formation of the tripartite alliance in September 2023. However, the profile of the new military leaders, the chronic presence of armed Islamist groups, and the difficulty in containing their territorial activities make it unlikely that security is a genuine priority for the overarching structure governing this arena, nor for the external partners involved in it (previously France, and now the United States, Russia, and Turkey). In practice, organized violence remains methodologically “useful” insofar as it dialectically legitimizes a state of emergency at the helm of the three Sahelian countries and emergency security measures. In terms of the political agenda, the three countries have launched initiatives aligned with the global establishment’s programmatic priorities, namely the promotion of biometric identification87 , the integrated and standardized management of resources88 , as well as participation in health surveillance systems89 (to be implemented before 2023). Although the AES has rhetorically questioned the monetary foundations of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), plans for central bank digital currencies in Nigeria90 and within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) have not been called into question thus far91 . These various elements, consistently championed in the pursuit of national autonomy, are also evident in the African Union’s Agenda 206392 .

This framework suggests that the Sahelian arena, like other ongoing dynamics in Africa, is intended to accelerate its integration into the infrastructure currently being deployed along the Silk Roads and related logistics corridors. The fact is that trade corridors have been identified as a priority for the AES93 . On the one hand, Nigeria serves as a maritime entry point for one of these corridors, which spans the Sahara to connect the Algerian coast of the Mediterranean94 . On the other side are Ghana and Togo, which serve as two other entry points capable of connecting Ouagadougou and Niamey95 . On a continental scale, it is noteworthy that other regions involved in the establishment of these land and maritime corridors96 are mired in conflicts that are being exploited to force their reconfiguration and plunder within the framework of this infrastructure. Ukraine97 , Iran98 , and the Gaza Strip99 are two cases that are both tragic and paradigmatic of these restructuring processes, the mechanisms of which are clearly identifiable. In other words, the deployment of these corridors within these various contexts is accompanied by violent destabilization and reconfiguration efforts whose nature is analogous to those we have observed in the Sahel.
The acceleration—or at least the strategic use—of conflict in the Sahel and across Africa is, for the time being, irreversible. This makes it urgent to develop a new framework for understanding reality by forging a framework capable of describing the mechanisms and strategies that shape this type of architecture. To date, the analytical frameworks of conflict studies and strategic intelligence have not facilitated such an effort. Nor will they do so in the future, given their inherent biases and limitations. The perpetuation of dependencies and subordination lies precisely in this mental insularity, which obscures the contours of the true offensive architecture. The call to develop new intellectual tools is therefore extended to all nonconformist and daring Africans who are concerned about this development.

 

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Notes

 

1. Aina, F., Afolabi, B., Fayemi, J.K. (2025). The Alliance of Sahel States, Democratic Relapse, Insecurity, and the Prospects of Regional (Dis)integration or (Re)integration in West Africa. In *Society* (2026) 63:60–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-025-01154-0
2. Treaty of July 6, 2024, establishing the Confederation of Sahel States (AES). Available at https://droit-et-politique-en-afrique.info/traite-du-6-juillet-2024-portant-creation-de-la-confederation-des-etats-du-sahel-aes
3. Turse, N. (2025). Pentagon: U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Have Failed Africans. Available at https://archive.ph/NGozf
4. This issue prompted the organization to host a webinar on August 29, 2026, with members of the Niofar Economic Intelligence in Africa community https://niofar-ie.africa.
5. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intervention_militaire_de_2011_en_Libye
6. Sherlock, R. (2011). Libya’s new rulers offer weapons to Syrian rebels. Available at https://archive.ph/vNSO
7. Abdoulaye Diop, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtYlKmOSHlY).
8. Goya, M. (2021). Barkhane— Analyse de l’engagement militaire de la France au Sahel. Available at https://www.institutmontaigne.org/expressions/barkhane-une-analyse-de-lengagement-militaire-francais-au-sahel
9. Isilow, H. (2021). African intellectuals remember the late Muammar Gaddafi as a pan-Africanist. Available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/african-intellectuals-remember-late-muammar-gaddafi-as-pan-african/2397444
10. Escape key. (2026). A Total Absence of Responsibility. Available at https://escapekey.substack.com/p/a-total-absence-of-responsibility
11. The Third Way: Wilhelm Röpke’s Vision of Social Order. Available at https://isi.org/the-third-way-wilhelm-ropkes-vision-of-social-order
12. Brittan, S. (1998). Some reflections on the third way. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110719021726/http://www.samuelbrittan.co.uk/spee3_p.html
13. Escape key (2026). Ibid.
14. Escape key (2026). Ibid.
15. Singapore, India, Brazil, Germany, Venezuela, China, Nicaragua.
16. Tarpley, W. (1994). Palmerston during the 1850s: A Tour of the Multicultural Zoo. In Larouche EIR, vol. 21, no. 16. Available at https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1994/eirv21n16-19940415/eirv21n16-19940415_006-palmerstons_london_during_the_18.pdf
17. Escape Key (2026). Any Old Ethic Will Do. Available at https://escapekey.substack.com/p/the-post-war-third-way
18. Colonel Gaddafi Part II: Gaddafi in London. Available at https://open.spotify.com/episode/0NZSkVMp8QdvT81DZvQpXN
19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu_Hsing_Kang_College
20. Ben Avraham, A. (2020). The CIA’s Project FF: Before the “Special Relationship.” Available at https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-cias-project-ff-before-the-special-relationship
21. Escape Key (2026). Ibid.
22. Soulard, F. (2026). Fighting in the New World. Dunken.
23. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Akufo-Addo
24. Dorril, S. (2000). MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations. Simon & Schuster.
25. South Africa : South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Nigeria: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Egypt: Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA), Morocco: Policy Center for the New South (PCNS), Algeria: Centre Africain d’Études et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme (CAERT), Tunisia: Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques (ITES), Ghana: Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Ivory Coast: Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (CIRES), Senegal: Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES), Kenya: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Ethiopia: Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Tanzania: Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Uganda: Uganda Institute of Peace and Development Studies, Rwanda: Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), Cameroon: Institut des Relations Internationales du Cameroun (IRIC), Zambia: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR), Zimbabwe: Sapes Trust, Namibia: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), Botswana: Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA).
26. Except for Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, which remained outside the international banking system.
27. King, I. (2022). True Sovereignty? The CFA Franc and French Influence in West and Central Africa. Available at https://harvard-international-review.ghost.io/true-sovereignty-the-cfa-franc-and-french-influence-in-west-and-central-africa/
28. Probably as part of a dialectical approach. See Sylla, N.S. (2020). The Franc Zone, a Tool of French Neocolonialism in Africa. Available at https://jacobin.com/2020/01/franc-zone-french-neocolonialism-africa
29. The BIS invites nine new members to join it. Available at https://www.bis.org/media-releases/19960909-bis-invites-nine-new-members-join-it
30. Newman, A. (2011). “Libyan Rebels” Create Central Bank, Oil Company. Available at https://thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/libyan-rebels-create-central-bank-oil-company/
31. Escape key (2026).The Full Technical Stack. Available at https://escapekey.substack.com/p/the-full-stack
32. He himself was educated in Great Britain and is part of the establishment.
33. Projets phares de l’Agenda 2063. Available at https://au.int/fr/agenda2063/projets-phares
34. Soulard, F. (2026). False Dichotomy and Sino-American Convergence. Available at https://dunia.earth/en/false-dichotomy-and-sino-american-convergence
35. Davis, A.R. (2026). Epstein Emails Expose Western Attempts to Exploit Libyan Assets Prior to Gaddafi’s Downfall. Available at https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/02/277449/epstein-emails-expose-western-attempts-to-exploit-libya-assets-prior-to-gaddafi-downfall/
36. Escape key (2026). Epstein III. The Intelligence Channel. Available at https://escapekey.substack.com/p/epstein-iii
37. Combating Terrorist Center (2007). Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. Available at http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
38. Tarpley, W.G. (2011). The CIA’s Libya Rebels: The Same Terrorists Who Killed U.S. and NATO Troops in Iraq. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110418032318/http://tarpley.net/2011/03/24/the-cia%E2%80%99s-libya-rebels-the-same-terrorists-who-killed-us-nato-troops-in-iraq
39. Nimmo, K. (2015). CIA Asset Joins Islamic State in Libya – Abdelhakim Belhadj Worked with the U.S. and NATO to Overthrow Gaddafi. Available at https://www.globalresearch.ca/cia-asset-joins-islamic-state-in-libya-abdelhakim-belhadj-worked-with-u-s-and-nato-to-overthrow-gaddafi%E3%80%80-%E3%80%80/5434923
40. Curtis, M. (2021). Four terrorists who murdered Britons fought in David Cameron’s war in Libya. Available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-25-four-terrorists-who-murdered-britons-fought-in-david-camerons-war-in-libya/
41. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdelhakim_Belhadj
42. Ibid.
43. Curtis, M. (2021). Ibid.
44. Bunel, P.H. (2016). Is Al Qaeda an “Existential Threat”? What is the Meaning of Al Qaeda in Arabic? Available at https://www.globalresearch.ca/al-qaeda-the-database-2/24738
45. Curtis, M. (2018). Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam. Serpent’s Tail.
46. Edward, M. (2044). The Crown Temple. Available at https://archive.li/gjrbf
47. Soulard, F. (2026). Ibid.
48. The Book of Trump – Chapter 10: The Tongo Tongo Ambush https://rumble.com/v6r44ha-the-book-of-trump-chapter-10.html
49. Turse, N. (2023). AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We Share “Core Values” With Coup Leaders. Available at https://archive.ph/5mmAM
50. Turse, N. (2023). How Many More Governments Will American-Trained Soldiers Overthrow? Available at https://archive.ph/xI1rZ
51. Paquette, D. (2020). Mali coup leader was trained by the U.S. military, officials say. Available at https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/africa/mali-coup-leader-us-military-colonel-assimi-goita-a9682426.html
52. Turse, N. (2022). Another U.S.-Trained Soldier Stages a Coup in West Africa. Available at https://archive.ph/PQZR8
53. York, G., Chase, S. (2020). For the second time in eight years, a coup in Mali has been led by a U.S.-trained soldier. Available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-for-second-time-in-eight-years-a-coup-in-mali-has-been-led-by-a-us
54. European Union Training Mission in Mali https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Training_Mission_in_Mali
55. Ubani, C. (2025). Congressman Reveals That U.S. Aid Funds Boko Haram, the Taliban, and Other Terrorist Groups. Available at https://westafricaweekly.com/congressman-discloses-that-u-s-aid-funds-boko-haram-taliban-and-other-terrorist-groups
56. Liptako-Gourma Charter. Available at https://aes.ml/download/charte-de-liptako-gourma-instituant-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel/?wpdmdl=2354&refresh=6a06d9954be071778833813
57. Treaty establishing the AES Confederation. Available at https://aes.ml/download/traite-portant-creation-de-la-confederation-aes/?wpdmdl=2356&refresh=6a06d99549fd11778833813